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PART II: PROCEDURAL RIGHTS AND SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS 
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INTRODUCTION 
This second part of this book is dedicated to procedural and substantive rights 
protection in the EU and the ECHR.  It demonstrates whether the EU and ECHR legal 
orders have fortified substantive rights with stronger guarantees on the formulation of 
distinct procedural rights.  As such, it provides a critique of the dual protection of 
human rights in Europe through an assessment of the evolution of the legal relationship 
between the CJEU and the ECtHR within the substantive areas of criminal law, labour 
law, asylum law and equality.  As it has been pointed out, a review of procedural and 
substantive rights exercised by the two European courts against acts adopted by the 
authorities of the signatory States is both valuable and well-timed due to current efforts 
to reform the working practices of the ECtHR and to facilitate the EU’s accession to the 
ECHR. Through carefully chosen case studies, these chapters therefore provide 
opportunities for the reader to gauge the extent to which the tensions and synergies that 
emerge from the EU-ECHR symbiosis shape (procedural and substantive) protection of 
human rights law in Europe.  As editors and discussants of this rich volume we have 
noted three main themes which run like a thread through this part of the collection 
which we would like to identify and address in turn. These are (i) the scope for 
convergence of protection by ECtHR and CJEU (ii) the scope for conflict, or to put it 
more diplomatically, conflicting approaches; and last but not least, (iii) the 
constitutional underpinnings or scope of rights protection.  We will conclude with some 
final comments on the future directions for substantive rights protection. 
 
THE SCOPE FOR CONVERGENCE OF PROTECTION BY THE ECTHR AND 
CJEU 
With the relationship between the ECtHR and CJEU increasingly under the spotlight, 
evidence of apparent convergent approaches to fundamental rights protection through 
case law is a ripening source for analysis.  While adjudicatory moves towards 
convergence tend to be incremental rather than giant leaps, the developments noted 
above make this analysis of the opportunities (or risks) posed by such convergence (or 
divergence) of ECtHR and CJEU jurisprudence all the more timely.  Moreover, the 
distinctions between ‘convergence’, ‘divergence’ and simple ‘conflict-avoidance’ can 
be subtle and not easy to detect; an issue which Ippolito and Velluti briefly touch on in 




The areas of asylum and equality examined in Chapters 8 and 9 provide particularly 
fruitful terrain for tracing the approaches of ECtHR and CJEU jurisprudence and the 
courts’ evolving constitutional relationship.  In respect of asylum, while acknowledging 
divergences in approaches by the two courts and the academic debate surrounding them, 
Ippolito and Velluti argue that ultimately a converging approach is evidenced by 
something more far-reaching than cross-citations of CJEU/ECtHR case law or examples 
of ‘parallel interpretation’ of Charter and Convention rights.  In their view, a judicial 
‘integrated European approach’ is emerging in the field of asylum, a phenomenon 
arising from a mutually reinforcing ‘progressive intersection’ of the two systems.  In 
contrast with the advanced degree of convergence illustrated in the field of asylum, 
Kapotas situates the concept of equality at a tipping point.  With clear substantive 
progress made in both the EU/ECHR legal orders in relation to positive action in gender 
equality, Kapotas argues that neither the CJEU nor ECtHR appear prepared to embrace 
the full implications of the new equality paradigm.  Therefore, in relation to 
convergence, substantive fields are, it seems, at different stages on the journey. 
In Chapter 8, Francesca Ippolito and Samantha Velluti analyse the approaches of the 
CJEU and ECtHR in the field of asylum, critically examining relevant jurisprudence 
vis-à-vis the ECHR and the CFR respectively (including the role of the so-called 
‘horizontal clauses’).  Drawing on the Court of Justice’s decision in NS v Home 
Secretary1 and the ECtHR’s decision in MSS,2 Ippolito and Velluti explore the 
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approaches of the two European Courts in relation to interpretation, jurisdiction, and 
their mutual influence.  In this respect, they note the ECHR as a ‘special source of 
inspiration’ for developing EU human rights law or the presumption of compliance of 
EU acts with the ECHR (Bosphorus).3  The authors examine the legality of and 
compatibility with the ECHR of the Dublin II Regulation, the Qualification Directive, 
the Asylum Procedures Directive and the Reception Conditions Directive. Their 
analysis highlights the complexities of the evolving constitutional relationship between 
the EU and ECHR systems in relation to asylum.  Evidence of both obvious 
convergence and ‘conflict-avoidance’ (adjudication without reference to the 
Convention) is identified.  In Ippolito and Velluti’s view, cases in the latter category 
may be motivated by the CJEU’s concern to protect the autonomy of the EU legal order.  
While this is a factor which will continue to occupy the CJEU, the authors are confident 
that, despite the complexity of this field, asylum will nonetheless prove to be a fertile 
area for convergence in adjudicatory approaches.  In conclusion, possible implications 
of EU accession to the ECHR are highlighted, with particular reference to the 
development of the Common European Asylum System, and to EU human rights law 
more generally.   
In Chapter 9, Panos Kapotas considers the distinct yet gradually converging approaches 
to equality in both the EU and the ECHR frameworks, with special reference to gender 
equality.  On the face of it, both systems are committed to equality, a concept rooted in 
national constitutional orders.  In relation to the ECHR, the concept of equality finds its 
concrete expression primarily through the prohibition of discrimination, while within 
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the framework of EU law, equality has been elevated into a main Union objective. 
Kapotas contends that the legal and political commitments to remove unjustified 
inequalities have not (yet?) produced the desired results.  European societies continue to 
be fraught with divisions which some commentators argue are directly attributable to 
doctrinal shortcomings.  Kapotas suggests that if equality continues to be understood as 
a ‘formulaic and neutral principle that creates minimal negative obligations’, existing 
inequalities will be perpetuated ad nauseam.  Against this rather pessimistic 
background, Kapotas asks whether positive action can become a core feature of the new 
European paradigm of full and effective equality.  Can positive action succeed as an 
element of ‘full and effective equality in practice’ where past efforts reliant on non-
discrimination alone have failed?  Kapotas examines the relationship between positive 
action and full equality by critically assessing the recent case-law of the ECtHR and the 
CJEU in relation to gender equality, and the possible transformative effects of Protocol 
12 ECHR.  The process for judicial appointments to the ECtHR demonstrates, in 
Kapotas’ view, the benefits of positive action in practice, the ECtHR’s advisory opinion 
constituting a ‘real breakthrough’ in the conceptualisation of positive action.  He 
concludes that the direction of progress looks favourable: the CJEU and ECtHR are 
gradually converging towards a common, more ‘substantive’ notion of equality.  
However, questions remain as to whether both the ECtHR and CJEU will be prepared to 
accept its implications.    
THE SCOPE FOR CONFLICT  
The imminent accession of the EU to the ECHR, and the growing closeness of the EU 
and ECHR legal orders have led to speculation about the likelihood for overlap, and to 
some extent, conflict between the two legal orders.  No doubt, accession will bring forth 
numerous tensions between EU law and ECHR law that will affect the jurisprudence of 
the two European Courts.  Most notably, accession will put into the test the coexistence 
of the ECHR with the CFR and the harmony between the two legal orders as currently 
reinforced by the Bosphorus presumption.  The scope for conflict between the two legal 
orders is depicted succinctly by Kargopoulos and Ludlow in Chapters 5 and 6 
respectively in the context of the protection of the right to a fair trial in criminal 
proceedings and the right to take collective action.  Both authors seem to agree in that 
the presumption that Member States observe the ECHR and Charter obligations is not 
conclusive.  Moreover, they both stress that although the EU’s accession will not affect 
the constitutional autonomy of EU law, it will somewhat provoke a shift in the CJEU’s 
current narrow approach to fundamental rights when these are in conflict with EU 
fundamental freedoms enshrined in EU primary law or the principle of mutual 
recognition as manifested in EU secondary law on the facilitation of an effective system 
for the surrender of persons. Although unsettling at first, EU accession to the ECHR is 
therefore a welcome development. 
In Chapter 5, Alexandros-Ioannis Kargopoulos reviews the presumption of equivalent 
protection with reference to the protection of fundamental rights guaranteed by the EU 
and juxtaposes it against the protection of the right to a fair trial in criminal proceedings 
enshrined in Article 6 ECHR and Article 48 CFR. The chapter boldly reveals the 
asymmetries in the protection of the right to a fair trial, the fundamental cornerstone of 
the criminal procedure, between the two legal orders and proposes an interpretative 
alignment of the two texts on the basis of their normative interrelationship.  
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Kargopoulos argues that the Bosphorus presumption of equivalence is exaggerated 
when it comes to the right to a fair trial and that, accordingly, it can be easily rebutted as 
the Treaty of Lisbon and the ECHR offer asymmetrical protection.  He contends that 
this asymmetry results from the differentiated conceptualisation of the right in the two 
texts.  The chapter further identifies the consequences that the EU’s accession to the 
ECHR may have in this respect.  Kargopoulos argues that accession would enhance the 
alleged asymmetry between the two legal orders and raises various criticisms vis-à-vis 
the prospective relationship between the EU and the ECHR and the two Courts which is 
given a normative content in Articles 6(3) TEU and 52(3) of the Charter.  For instance, 
he posits that the legal commitment of the CJEU to follow the jurisprudence of the 
ECtHR regarding any corresponding rights found in the Charter is an abstract one.  
Equally, post-accession, the presumption of equivalent protection, as envisaged and 
established in the case-law of the ECtHR, has no longer any legitimate ground, nor legal 
basis.  The chapter provides insight to the way the ECtHR would carry out its external 
control over the EU in concrete human rights cases regarding the conformity of 
secondary EU legislation, such as the European Arrest Warrant Framework Decision, to 
fair trial guarantees.  This is most relevant, given the recent unpopular CJEU decision in 
Radu4 on the extent to which Member States are required to take into account the right 
to a fair trial as guaranteed by the Charter and the ECHR when executing an EAW.  It 
appears that the need for an efficient EAW system and the principle of mutual 
recognition will have to be watered down post-accession in a more ECHR-friendly 
manner. 
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 In a similar vein, in Chapter 6, Amy Ludlow critiques the extent to which the two legal 
orders have accepted certain rights as fundamental.  She does so by situating labour 
rights within the wider human rights discourse.  In particular, the chapter sheds further 
light upon the relationship between the CJEU and the ECtHR by bringing to the fore 
tensions that are emerging in their jurisprudence vis-à-vis the right to strike.  The 
chapter sets off by discussing the variation in perceptions of strike action in Europe 
before it goes on to raise the longstanding tension between individual rights and 
collective rights, a tension which – according to the author – can be traced back to the 
negotiations that led to the adoption of the ECHR.  Ludlow reviews the potentially 
conflicting jurisprudence of the CJEU and ECtHR over the right to take collective 
action.  She argues that there is an apparent jurisprudential gulf on this issue between 
the ECtHR and CJEU.  This gulf mainly stems from the CJEU’s infamous Viking and 
Laval decisions,5 which place additional limits upon possibilities for lawful collective 
action in favour of the EU’s internal market mentality.  By contrast, the ECtHR’s 
relevant case law demonstrates significant rigour in protecting the right to strike within 
the ECHR framework.  Against the background of a recent application to the ECHR by 
UK prison officers, who are not allowed to go on strike, Ludlow demonstrates that the 
collective action case law of the two European courts is fundamentally irreconcilable, 
leading to a possibility of a high noon conflict between them.  Once the EU accedes to 
the ECHR, this jurisprudential conflict might be partially resolved through the direct 
                                                     
5




review of the CJEU’s case law on human rights grounds by the ECtHR.  Ludlow 
speculates that, provided that the ECtHR relishes this new opportunity to review EU 
acts, such a development may assist the EU to re-discover the social limits on its 
market. 
THE SCOPE OF RIGHTS PROTECTION  
The scope of rights protection is equally important in the context of the EU’s accession 
to the ECHR, which according to Luke Mason, author of Chapter 7, constitutes an 
important ‘constitutional’ moment in the history of the EU.  In line with the preceding 
chapter, this contribution focuses on the substantive area of labour law rights.  Yet, 
while Ludlow situates those rights within the wider human rights discourse, Mason 
positions labour rights within the EU’s thicker constitutional discourse - one that strives 
for ‘ordered and principled solutions to the complexities of competing constitutional 
claims’.  The author presents labour law as part of a European ‘industrial constitution’ 
which will become richer following EU accession to the ECHR and which legitimises 
the latter’s supervisory role and embedded constitutional values.  However, despite this 
significant impact, Mason argues that significant changes in terms of the rights of actors 
in the European industrial constitution cannot be brought about through rights-based 
judicial supervision alone, which instead require a deliberate re-ordering of market 
actors in the EU.  
 
Chapter 7 commences with a historical overview of the evolution of ‘social’ justice 
encompassing employment rights and labour law in Europe.  It portrays the ancillary 
place which labour law and social rights have enjoyed in both the EU and the ECHR 
traditions.  Mason then moves on to consider the constitutional ramifications of the EU 
accession to the ECHR, the technicalities of which he calls ‘Byzantine’.  He looks at the 
bigger picture by pointing out that the stark distinction between the two legal orders can 
be summarised as follows.  Whilst the EU is understood as an autonomous legal order 
of States and people, as most recently stressed by the CJEU in Mox Plant6 and Kadi,7 
the ECHR has always been understood in public international law terms.  As such, the 
ECHR is non-constitutional in nature and consequently EU accession to the ECHR 
cannot bring about critical constitutional change of this nature.  Of course, incorporation 
of external legal sources often occurs in EU law but such incorporation always occurs 
on the CJEU’s own terms – i.e. in a way that is not offensive to the principles of EU 
autonomy and EU law primacy.  With this in mind, the chapter notes that an important 
feature of accession is that it will no longer be in the hands of the CJEU to decide the 
impact of ECHR rights on EU law – a monopoly which so far Bosphorus has tolerated 
so long as the level of rights protection in the EU is not ‘manifestly deficient’.  As a 
consequence, accession will be most significant in injecting a clear set of values to 
provide a normative structure to resolve complex constitutional dilemmas in European 
law. In the context of labour law, no doubt EU accession will bring qualitative changes 
mandating a more rights-driven approach.  However, this is likely to have less of a 
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transformative effect than it may first appear, as it fails to significantly alter the market 
configuration of the EU, instead merely tempering its excesses.  Building on work 
which understands private law as ‘constitutional’ in nature by virtue of the manner in 
which it constitutes market actors and governs their interaction, the chapter concludes 
by underlining the significant limitations of accession with regard to European labour 
law, where trade unions possess limited market agency.  It remains to be seen therefore 
whether accession will generate a constitutional moment. 
CONCLUSION: FUTURE DIRECTIONS FOR RIGHTS PROTECTION  
In their roles as defenders of fundamental rights in the EU and ECHR legal orders, the 
CJEU and ECtHR face inevitable challenges delivering judgments which arguably 
impact on the constitutional ‘space’ at both national and supranational levels.  Adopting 
adjudicatory approaches which, on one hand, show sensitivity to national constitutional 
norms and traditions, while on the other hand, actively shape broader standards of rights 
protection, can be a delicate balancing act.  Such adjudication inevitably places the 
legitimacy of both the CJEU and ECtHR in terms of their relationships with national 
courts under constant scrutiny.   
The developments which led the editors to hold the workshop on which this collection 
is based remain a work in progress.  However, change is imminent on various fronts.  
The legal instruments which will provide for EU accession to the Convention have, 
after much delay, recently been finalised.  Protocols 15 and 16 ECHR, which aim to 
introduce a series of reforms to the ECtHR’s practice and procedure, have been adopted 
and (at the time of writing) are open for signature.  On the part of the CJEU, litigation 
testing the meaning, scope and reach of Charter provisions (Fransson, Melloni, Radu8) 
has naturally proven to be contentious. The future procedural and substantive 
developments in the two systems will require unprecedented degrees of co-operation 
and mutual respect on the parts of both courts, as they continue to mould a true ‘Europe 
of Rights’. As our contributors have illustrated, the interpretive challenges involved in 
the multiplicity of sources of rights protection in the EU/ECHR systems provide rich 
material for both judicial and academic debate. In examining the evolution of 
procedural and substantive rights protection in the EU/ECHR legal orders, they have 
presented a vision of a dynamic European field of human rights protection; one which 
the CJEU and ECtHR will continue to shape in progressive, and no doubt high-profile, 
ways.  
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